Performance RecapSerendipity Anna MariaSince the Strategy Change · Sep 4, 2026
Anna Maria Island, FL 17 units managed Yield strategy overhaul: Jun 24, 2026
Attribution · Reservations Created Since Jun 24

Since the yield strategy overhaul, new bookings on the same 8 units are up 120% in dollar value, with more reservations, more nights, and higher rates, all at once.

This isolates demand actually generated under the new strategy, using the date each reservation was booked (not the date of the stay), so a stay this fall that was actually booked back in March never gets credited to work that started June 24. Same 8 units in both years, so portfolio growth never inflates it either.

+32.9%
New bookings created · 97 vs 73
+119.9%
Rent booked · $730,963 vs $332,402
+58.1%
Nights booked · 487 vs 308
+39.1%
ADR on new bookings · $1,501 vs $1,079
Attribution

Volume and rate both moved up together, and it's not universal, which is what makes it credible.

Same 8 same-store units, bookings placed in the 72 days since the strategy change, compared to bookings placed in the same 72-day window a year earlier. This is the number that actually isolates Pacer's work from whatever the owner already had on the books.

Booked Jun 24 – Sep 4, 2026 vs Booked Jun 24 – Sep 4, 2025
UnitBookingsNights bookedAvg booking windowAvg length of stayRent booked
Serendipity Deux14 vs 7128 vs 27130 vs 73 days9.1 vs 3.9 nights+733.8%
$289,339 vs $34,700
Serendipity Gulf19 vs 10100 vs 3880 vs 51 days5.3 vs 3.8 nights+304.2%
$140,986 vs $34,880
Serendipity12 vs 549 vs 1842 vs 56 days4.1 vs 3.6 nights+248.1%
$59,965 vs $17,224
Waves8 vs 731 vs 2971 vs 102 days3.9 vs 4.1 nights+26.9%
$32,801 vs $25,852
Tripletail13 vs 1156 vs 4963 vs 77 days4.3 vs 4.5 nights+18.6%
$65,460 vs $55,210
Beach Bliss11 vs 942 vs 3956 vs 79 days3.8 vs 4.3 nights+11.4%
$31,470 vs $28,260
Cloud 911 vs 1148 vs 57145 vs 93 days4.4 vs 5.2 nights-13.0%
$77,229 vs $88,750
Fantasea9 vs 1333 vs 5118 vs 54 days3.7 vs 3.9 nights-29.1%
$33,713 vs $47,526
Total · 8 units97 vs 73487 vs 30890 vs 73 days5.0 vs 4.2 nights+119.9%
$730,963 vs $332,402
Honest read: Cloud 9 and Fantasea both booked less in this window than a year ago, worth watching rather than burying. The gains are real and broad (6 of 8 units up, 3 of them by triple digits), but Serendipity Deux's +733.8% includes one $135,953 direct booking (a 56-night winter stay). Excluding that single reservation, Serendipity Deux is still up 342%, so the result holds without it, but it's worth knowing the outlier is there before quoting the headline number. Book-wide, guests are also booking further out (90 days vs 73) and staying longer (5.0 nights vs 4.2), though that isn't universal either, Fantasea and Cloud 9 (the two units that declined) also saw shorter booking windows, consistent with more last-minute, gap-filling demand rather than planned stays.
Distribution

From one channel's demand to three.

Rent booked in the same Jun 24 – Sep 4 window, all 16 homes (not limited to the 8 same-store units), by channel. A year ago Airbnb carried more than two-thirds of the book. Today no single channel controls more than 40%, and the mix grew on top of Airbnb, not instead of it.

Booked Jun 24 – Sep 4, 2026 vs Booked Jun 24 – Sep 4, 2025 · all homes
ChannelPrior yearThis yearChange
Direct$100,599 (25.3%)$428,968 (39.7%)+326.4%
Airbnb$273,349 (68.7%)$388,069 (35.9%)+41.9%
VRBO$24,204 (6.1%)$263,515 (24.4%)+988.6%
Total · all homes$398,152$1,080,553+171.4%
A one-platform book is a fragile one. Direct is now the largest channel by dollars, and VRBO went from an afterthought (6% of rent) to nearly a quarter of it. That mix protects the portfolio from any single channel's algorithm, fee changes, or demand pullback.
Market benchmark

The market was up. Serendipity was up 2.6x more.

August 2026 versus August 2025, full 16-home portfolio, benchmarked against the Anna Maria comp set (895 properties). If this were just a rising tide, the portfolio would track the market. It beat the market on every dimension.

August 2026 vs August 2025
MetricSerendipityAnna Maria marketAdvantage
RevPAR growth+71%+27%2.6x market
Occupancy growth+37.9%+15.4%2.5x market
ADR growth+24%+9.4%2.6x market
In absolute terms, Serendipity ran 123% above market RevPAR in August ($793 vs $356).
Verified reservations

Four of the largest new bookings, checked against their matched week last year.

Each reservation below is compared against its matched weekday a year earlier, not just the calendar date, so the comparison lines up exactly.

Supporting context · Year to Date

The full calendar-year view tells a similar story, with one caveat.

This table compares all of 2026 to all of 2025 on the same 8 units, which is useful context but blends nearly six months of pre-strategy performance (Jan 1 – Jun 23) in with the post-June-24 work above. Treat the attribution table above as the one that isolates Pacer's actual impact; treat this one as the wider backdrop.

Jan 1 – Sep 3, 2026 vs Jan 1 – Sep 3, 2025
UnitRevenueOccupancyADRRevPAR
Cloud 9+236.2%
$484,192 vs $144,031
+57.8pp+19.3%+292.9%
Serendipity Deux+168%
$454,541 vs $169,919
+41.0pp+18.3%+181%
Serendipity Gulf+207.8%
$356,537 vs $115,845
+48.9pp+19.4%+212.0%
Tripletail+118%
$387,751 vs $177,565
+37.3pp-1.3%+101%
Serendipity+105%
$242,880 vs $118,444
+33.0pp-1.8%+108%
Fantasea+42.7%
$240,608 vs $168,559
+26.2pp-12.0%+48.5%
Beach Bliss+46.1%
$208,675 vs $142,814
+24.5pp-6.0%+52.5%
Waves+142%
$204,564 vs $84,437
+34.7pp+9.1%+158%
Total · 8 units+130%
$2,579,748 vs $1,121,614
+37.8pp+8.7%+138%
Read: occupancy nearly doubled book-wide (31.8% to 69.6%) while ADR still rose 8.7%, the combination that drives RevPAR up 138%. Four units (Tripletail, Serendipity, Fantasea, Beach Bliss) show ADR essentially flat or slightly down year over year, meaning their entire gain came from filling the calendar, not from raising rates, exactly the sequencing you want when taking over a portfolio mid-year.
Trailing 90 days

The same story holds on a shorter, more recent window.

Two cuts: all 17 currently active units against the 10 that existed in the portfolio a year ago, and the 10 units with a clean booking-history match in both windows.

Jun 5 – Sep 3, 2026 vs Jun 5 – Sep 3, 2025
CohortRevenueOccupancyADRRevPAR
All units (17 vs 10 prior yr)+119.9%
$1,264,035 vs $574,818
+13.1pp+3.8%+29.4%
Booked both periods (10 units)+64.4%
$945,118 vs $574,818
+19.4pp+20.3%+64.4%
Forward pace

Bookings for the next 90 days are running far ahead of last year.

What's on the books today for stays through early December, against what was booked by the same date last year.

+99.2%
RevPAR booked so far · $558.82 vs $280.59
+99.2%
Revenue on the books · $402,350 vs $202,023
+18.1%
ADR booked so far
+17.6pp
Occupancy booked so far
Figures above use the 8-unit reconciled cohort (units with a clean prior-year comparison), the same one behind the year-to-date table. The full active book paces even higher (revenue on the books up 184.6%), but that number blends in newer units with no fair baseline, so treat the 8-unit read as the credible one. Window: Sep 3 – Dec 2, 2026 vs bookings made by the same date for Sep 3 – Dec 2, 2025.
Where we're focused next

One open item from the last review, not a performance concern.

VRBO distribution underweight
17.6% of bookings vs 50% on Airbnb

VRBO visibility is degraded relative to Airbnb, and no promotional activity has been run yet to close the gap.

Next step: launch VRBO OTA promotions and visibility tactics without lowering the overall price floor.
Pricing floors

Up to $335,311 in additional revenue identified over the next 365 days.

Minimum nightly rates are checked against confirmed bookings in each unit's benchmark market and bedroom-count segment over the trailing 12 months, not as a flat percentage off the base rate. 5 of the 16 units have enough clean booking history to recommend a specific new floor with confidence. 15 of the 16 units have taken bookings below their own current floor sometime in the past year, worth $320,093 in total, meaning real demand exists at rates below what's currently set as the minimum almost across the entire portfolio.

Stays over the next 365 days · floors checked against the trailing 12 months of bookings
UnitCurrent floorBookings below floor, TTMSuggested floorEst. recovery, 365d
Shangri-La$2,1504 · $22,513$1,499 – $1,738up to $130,133
Serendipity Deux$1,25020 · $75,381$720 – $906up to $104,784
Limefish Luxury$1,3502 · $17,732$344 – $544up to $45,738
Sandcastle$7002 · $5,167$344 – $544up to $28,401
The Salty Fern$6751 · $3,372$344 – $544up to $26,254
Serendipity$82520 · $45,708not enough data yet
Cloud 9$1,25010 · $38,690not enough data yet
Key Lime Cottage$36023 · $19,001not enough data yet
Fantasea$7509 · $23,982not enough data yet
Beach Bliss$62510 · $16,241not enough data yet
Serendipity Gulf$8256 · $17,762not enough data yet
Waves$60010 · $17,174not enough data yet
Tripletail$8256 · $12,743not enough data yet
Beach Escape$3252 · $3,300not enough data yet
Salt + Sol$4801 · $1,328not enough data yet
Total · 15 units126 · $320,093$227,344 – $335,311
Recovery ranges from $227,344 (a conservative floor where 60% of comparable bookings still clear) to $335,311 (an aggressive floor where 80% still clear), based on the 5 units with enough data to model precisely. Key Lime Cottage stands out: 23 separate bookings cleared below its $360 floor in the past year, the most of any unit, but there still isn't enough clean history to recommend a specific new number. The other 9 without a modeled recovery still show real, sizable leakage and are worth a manual review even before the data catches up.
Bottom line

The attribution holds up from every angle. New bookings created since the June 24 strategy change are up 120% in dollar value on the same 8 units, distribution diversified from 69% Airbnb to a three-channel mix with no channel over 40%, August RevPAR beat the Anna Maria market by 2.6x, and there's another $227K to $335K in identified pricing-floor upside on top of all of it. The year-to-date and forward-pace views back it up independently, and the honest misses (Cloud 9, Fantasea) are shown alongside the wins. This is what happens when pricing, distribution, and pacing are actively managed every day instead of set and left alone.